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Abstract. Negotiation theory and implied agency costs provide the foundation for the
research hypothesis that equity real estate investment trusts (EREITs) may have paid
premiums when making real property acquisitions during the 1990s REIT boom. Using
a simultaneous equations model and data from the Atlanta, Phoenix and Seattle
apartment markets, this research ﬁnds that apartment EREITs have paid above market
prices for property acquisitions. In Atlanta, a 26.1% premium was evident; in Phoenix,
a 27.5% premium was evident; while in Seattle, a premium was not evident. At the
property level, the returns to EREITs and private sector or non-securitized investors may
differ substantially.
Introduction
In the last ﬁve years, equity real estate investment trusts (EREITs) have become major
owners and managers of institutional grade real estate. According to the 1997 edition
of the REIT Handbook, EREIT total assets at year-end 1996 were $95B. Concurrently,
the market capitalization of publicly traded EREITs was $78B, which is a dramatic
increase over year-end 1991’s $8.7B. Armed with access to both equity and debt
markets, EREITs have been able to expand via property acquisition and development,
substantially increasing assets under ownership and management.
This increased EREIT market activity has gained the attention of academic and
investment analysts as evidenced by continued EREIT related research.1 Within this
foundation of research, however, the question of whether EREITs have paid market
prices for property acquisitions has not been empirically tested. If EREITs have paid
prices greater than market value for real estate acquisitions, then any implied, but not
yet empirically evidenced, structural gains for EREITs in comparison to other real
estate ownership forms must also be sufﬁcient to offset potential property acquisition
premiums. In essence, if EREITs have paid acquisition premiums, then EREITs must
evidence property level efﬁciencies, in addition to portfolio level efﬁciencies and
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capital structural efﬁciencies, in order to make a claim as a potentially more effective
ownership structure for real property.
Additionally, the existence of an EREIT price effect would decrease support for the
concept of EREIT returns acting as a proxy for direct real estate returns. If the real
estate market2 allows for EREIT transactions to be priced differently than other
property transactions, then EREIT return performance, although potentially correlated
with appraisal-based returns due to the use of EREIT purchases as sales comparables
for property appraisals, actually may not proxy the performance of the general real
estate market. Thus, the question of interest is similar to the question, ‘‘Do
Syndications Pay More for Real Estate?’’ posed by Beaton and Sirmans (1986). Do
EREITs pay more for real estate?
Literature Review and Research Framework
Corgel, McIntosh and Ott (1995), in their exhaustive review of research on REITs,
segment REIT related research into three general categories—investment issues,
ﬁnancial issues and risk, and return and portfolio diversiﬁcation issues. Even within
these three categories, however, stock price movements and returns are the central
focus of research with some measure of return generally being the dependent variable
of interest. Research has focused on what affects REIT share performance and how
REITs as an asset class perform with substantial emphasis on the integration of
EREITs, unsecuritized real estate and the stock market (Liu, Hartzell, Grieg and
Grissom, 1990; Ambrose, Ancel and Grifﬁths, 1992; Liu and Mei, 1992; Gyourko
and Keim, 1992; Myer and Webb, 1993; Pagliari and Webb 1995 and others), portfolio
efﬁciency (Kuhle, 1987; Han and Liang, 1995 and others) and inﬂation hedging
(Hartzell, Hekman and Miles, 1987; Park, Mullineaux and Chew, 1990; Bond and
Webb, 1995; Yobaccio, Rubens and Ketcham, 1995; and others).
This research takes a related, but slightly different approach than most of the prior
REIT research by investigating the effect apartment EREIT acquisitions have on the
actual market price paid for real estate within the physical real estate market. Prior
empirical research by Beaton and Sirmans (1986) on the effect of syndicators on the
selling price of apartments indicated that syndicators did not pay above market prices
for their apartment complex acquisitions. Forgey, Rutherford and VanBuskirk (1994)
found that institutions disposing of single family property acquired via foreclosure
were willing to sell property at a discount to market value. Carroll, Clauretie and Neil
(1997) using a different data set and additional model speciﬁcation, however, did not
ﬁnd this effect. With regard to income producing multifamily real estate, Hardin and
Wolverton (1996) found that institutions owning apartments acquired by foreclosure
were willing to sell property at a discount to market value. This present research
extends these investigations into market participant effects by investigating whether
EREITs, one of the real estate growth vehicles of the 1990s, have paid above market
prices when acquiring apartment properties. The substantial increase in EREIT capital
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whether securitized and unsecuritized real estate markets are segmented and the use
of EREIT returns as a proxy for real estate make the research topic a question of
substantial interest.
Equity REITs, Acquisition Strategies and Price
Unlike publicly traded stocks and bonds, commercial real estate is sold and purchased
via a negotiated transaction. Situations often exist where atypical motivations by
transaction participants can be used to move the ﬁnal negotiated transaction price
either upward or downward within a range of potential prices. With respect to atypical
motivations placing downward pressure on sales price, such an effect has been
manifested with properties obtained via foreclosure having been shown to sell at a
discount to market value. Likewise, but with an upward bias, it can be postulated that
the real estate market environment within which apartment EREITs made acquisitions
during the latest EREIT expansion created a situation whereby EREITs either chose
or were forced into acquisition strategies that made over payment for individual
properties more probable. Speciﬁc conditions, which may have created the upward
pressure on EREIT property acquisition prices, are outlined in the following
paragraphs.
Although there is substantial debate over the efﬁciencies of EREITs versus other forms
of institutional ownership of real estate,3 the belief of some EREIT proponents and
EREIT managers that EREITs can obtain multiple operating efﬁciencies4 does impact
EREITs’ acquisition strategies. If EREIT managers as buyers of real property believe
that they can obtain efﬁciencies, then they will be more likely to pay a premium in
acquisitions. For the purpose of this investigation, any speciﬁc EREIT’s actual ability
to achieve efﬁciencies is not of importance as a belief in efﬁciencies alone would be
sufﬁcient to move the EREIT toward the higher end of the range of potential
transaction prices.
Concurrently, as Graff and Webb (1997) point out, there may be supply constraints
that lead to ‘‘apparent bidding frenzies’’ within the institutional real estate investment
sector when investment managers look to acquire sector speciﬁc real estate to balance
portfolios. This agency cost effect would also apply to EREITs, especially to those
involved in the apartment market as an entirely new investment category was being
formulated during the 1990’s EREIT expansion. Apartment portfolios were not only
being re-balanced, they were being created.
EREITs faced additional market conditions that likely increased asset acquisition
related agency costs that may be evidenced in the mis-pricing of property acquisitions.
The investment community’s demand for individual EREIT size and geographic
diversity made an aggressive acquisition policy a necessity. Similarly, EREIT level
management concerns over potential forced mergers may have generated an agency
cost by making acquisitions a priority. The ability to increase per share FFO by
replacing cash equivalents with real assets or using relatively low cost, short-term
lines of credit to fund asset expansion would have also caused EREITs to be116 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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aggressive bidders for available apartment acquisitions. EREITs faced an environment
that pushed for higher acquisition prices when necessary, as any agency costs
associated with mis-priced acquisitions might not be immediately apparent.
For the period under study, there are competing, but not inconsistent arguments for
an EREIT premium. A willingness to pay an acquisition premium could be a sound
long-term strategic move if EREIT proponents are actually correct and any premium
is offset by organizational efﬁciencies when compared to other forms of real estate
ownership. Or, concurrently, the acquisition premium could be evidence of an agency
cost associated with the EREIT structure, large capital ﬂows to EREITs and the
creation of large real estate portfolios.
In order to accommodate potential EREIT motives for paying higher prices than other
(i.e., typical) market participants when acquiring real estate investment properties, the
following discussion based on Quan and Quigley (1989) is given.
Consider two parties, a seller and a buyer, negotiating the sale of an institutional
quality real property, property i, such that:
BB B B P 5 E [P uI ] 1 « , (1) iT (iSB)ti
and
SS S S P 5 E [P uI ] 1 « , (2) iT (iSB)ti
where:
5 B Pi The buyer’s ceiling price for property i;
5 S Pi The seller’s reservation price for property i;
EB[PTu ] 5 B I(iSB)t The buyer’s expectation regarding the ultimately negotiated
transaction price, PT, based on the buyer’s information concerning
property i, seller S and buyer B (including a rationale for paying
higher than typical prices) at time t;
ES[PTu ] 5 S I(iSB)t The seller’s expectation regarding the ultimately negotiated
transaction price, PT, based on the seller’s information concerning
property i, seller S (including possible knowledge of the buyer’s
rationale for paying higher than typical prices) and buyer B at time
t;
5 B «i Ceiling-price-setting error; and
5 S «i Reservation-price setting error.
The values set by the buyer and seller for and determine three possible BS PP ii
outcomes to the negotiation (assuming, for simplicity, that the negotiated outcome
hinges solely on price). When 5 , the property will sell at a single, mutually BS PP ii
agreeable price. Secondly, when , , the negotiation will fail to result in a BS PP ii
mutually agreeable price, and there will be no sale. Thirdly, when . , the BS PP ii
negotiation will result in a negotiated transaction price such that $ PT $ . BS PP iiREIT PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS: DO APARTMENT REITS PAY A PREMIUM? 117
The ﬁnal outcome possibility is of interest here, and three plausible information states
are relevant: (1) $ PT $ , and the seller does not know that the buyer is an
BS PP ii
EREIT and therefore has no knowledge concerning the buyer’s potential ability and
willingness to pay a price higher than paid by typical market participants; (2) $
B Pi
PT $ , and the seller does know the EREIT buyer’s identity but is uninformed
S Pi
regarding the buyer’s atypical, upwardly-biasing price motives; or (3) $ PT $
B Pi
, and the seller does know the EREIT buyer’s identity and is informed regarding
S Pi
the buyer’s atypical, upwardly-biasing price motives. Under information states (1) and
(2), applicable to negotiation with an EREIT buyer would differ little, if any, from
S Pi
applicable to negotiation with another ‘‘typical’’buyer. However, under information
S Pi
state (3) , applicable to negotiation with an EREIT buyer is expected to be greater
S Pi
than applicable to negotiation with another ‘‘typical’’ buyer.
S Pi
The net effect of an EREIT purchase negotiation, vis-a `-vis a typical buyer’s purchase
negotiation, is that and $ ,
B(EREIT) B(TYPICAL) S(EREIT BUYER) S(NON-EREIT BUYER) P $ PP P ii i i
where the parenthetical superscripts identify the relevant negotiating parties.
Therefore, the expected value of PT when the buyer is an EREIT, is greater than the
expected value of PT when the buyer is typical (i.e., not an EREIT). This is because,
as Quan and Quigley (1989:222) note, ‘‘the feasible set of prices from which all
transactions must be drawn is the region between the two prices,’’ (i.e., from to
S Pi
), and the transaction price will result from an arbitrary weight v,0# v # 1, as
B Pi
follows:
SB P 5 v P 1 (1 2 v)P , (3) Ti i
where v is determined by market conditions and/or relative bargaining power.
Since
B(EREIT) B(TYPICAL) P . P , (4) ii
and
S(EREIT BUYER) S(NON-EREIT BUYER) P $ P , (5) ii
from Equation (3), it follows that:
E[P ubuyer is an EREIT] . E[P ubuyer is typical]. (6) TT
This anticipated negotiation outcome is illustrated in Exhibit 1, and leads to the
research hypothesis that EREIT real estate purchase prices will be systematically
higher than typical real estate purchase prices.
Simultaneous Equation Model of an Ownership Apartment
Market
To empirically test this general hypothesis, a simultaneous equation model accounting
for the endogenous determination of price and quantity in a competitive market for118 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 1
Ranges of Possible Transaction Prices
EREIT versus Non-EREIT Buyers When $ PT $ BS PP ii
ownership of apartment properties is used. Borrowing from the example found in
Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), apartment supply and demand is modeled as:
dd d Q 5 aP 1 Z b 1 m , (7)
ss s Q 5 gP 1 Z d 1 m , (8)
where Qd is the quantity demanded, Qs is the quantity supplied, P is the price, Zd is
a vector of exogenous demand variables, Zs is a vector of exogenous supply variables,
and md and ms are random noise. Assuming a competitive market:
ds Q 5 Q 5 Q. (9)
Therefore, the market-clearing price P is endogenously determined by the equality of
Equations (7) and (8).
Substituting Q for Qd and Qs, the demand and supply functions can be rewritten in
terms of observable price P and quantity Q as follows:
dd (Demand) Q 5 aP 1 Z b 1 m , (10)
ss (Supply) P 5 gQ 1 Z d 1 m . (11)
Equation (10) represents the aggregate demand for apartments and Equation (11)REIT PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS: DO APARTMENT REITS PAY A PREMIUM? 119
Exhibit 2
Descriptive Statistics—Atlanta Apartment Sales
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Price 12,053,082.00 7,859,599.00 2,940,000 39,500,000
Age (years) 11.94 7.90 1 27
Units 293.49 126.97 102 632
EGI 1,999,844.00 1,023,444.00 850,988 5,511,464
Permits 1,597.00 1,150.00 62 4,102
Population 3,264,694.00 65,470.00 2,230,730 3,160,192
Note: n 5 78.
represents the aggregate supply of apartment units. Modeling these two equations
simultaneously accounts for the actions of developers who determine the number of
apartment units in a given market and investors who trade in developed apartment
projects.
Data and Empirical Model
In order to increase the external validity of this study, the data were generated from
three large real estate markets with active institutional investment—Atlanta, GA,
Phoenix, AZ and Seattle, WA (Shilton, Stanley and Tandy, 1996). The Atlanta data
were compiled by the Valuation Services Group of NationsBank’s Real Estate Banking
Group. The Phoenix and Seattle data were compiled by Comps, Inc. of San Diego,
CA, a national ﬁrm providing veriﬁed comparable real estate sales data. The two data
sources reduce the potential for measurement error. The sample data are restricted to
institutional sized property sales at the city level.5 There were no EREIT sellers found
in the sample data, they were purchasers only.
The Atlanta data (Exhibit 2) includes 78 sales of large apartment complexes for the
time period January, 1993 to May, 1995. Nineteen of the sales are EREIT purchases.
The average number of units for apartments in the data set is 293 with the average
age at sale date being 11.9 years. The average apartment purchase price is
$12,053,082. The aggregate value of the apartment sales in the sample is
$940,140,396. The number of units per apartment complex ranges from 102 units to
632 units. The Phoenix data (Exhibit 3) is composed of 105 sales of large apartment
complexes for the time period January, 1993 to June, 1996. Sixteen of the observations
are EREIT acquisitions. The average number of units for apartments in the data set
is 268 with the average age at sale date being 12.8 years. The average apartment
purchase price is $9,165,369. The aggregate value of the apartment sales in the sample
is $962,363,745. The number of units per apartment complex ranges from 150 units
to 856 units. The Seattle data (Exhibit 4) includes 119 sales of large apartment
complexes for the time period January, 1991 to June, 1997. Eighteen of the sales are
EREIT purchases. The average number of units for apartments in the data set is 256120 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 3
Descriptive Statistics—Phoenix Apartment Sales
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Price 9,165,369.00 6,637,931.00 1,100,000 30,501,000
Age (years) 12.84 6.91 0 31
Units 268.29 123.55 150 856
EGI 1,560,937.00 908,811.00 208,645 4,835,124
Permits 1,607.00 845.00 220 3,899
Population 2,398,576.00 106,497.00 2,230,730 2,568,721
Note: n 5 105.
Exhibit 4
Descriptive Statistics—Seattle Apartment Sales
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Price 11,902,706.00 6,795,546.00 2,392,000 41,125,000
Age (years) 11.42 7.87 1 50
Units 255.86 102.33 150 750
EGI 1,827,320.00 866,606.00 744,510 5,245,275
Permits 1,149.00 535.00 373 2,681
Population 2,157,377.00 59,213.00 2,023,559 2,242,323
Note: n 5 119.
with the average age at sale date being 11.4 years. The average apartment purchase
price is $11,902,706. The aggregate value of the sales in the sample is $1,416,422,014.
The number of units per Seattle complex ranges from 150 units to 750 units. The
aggregate value of the sales in the three market samples is $3,318,926,153.
During the period over which the data were compiled, there were eight public
apartment EREITs active in the Atlanta market, six public apartment EREITs active
in the Phoenix market and ﬁve public apartment EREITs active in the Seattle market.
A total of ﬁfteen apartment EREITs were included in the sample. Thirteen of the
EREITs were active in only one of the markets under study; one EREIT was active
in two markets; and only one EREIT was active in all three of the markets. The lack
of substantial overlap in EREIT participants at the city level minimizes the effect of
a single EREIT market participant.
Apartment sale price is estimated using a simultaneous-equation model with apartment
building permits used to proxy for demand for new apartment units. The estimation
equations, similar to the model employed by Shilling, Sirmans and Guidry (1991),
are detailed below:REIT PROPERTY ACQUISITIONS: DO APARTMENT REITS PAY A PREMIUM? 121
(Demand) Permits 5 a 1 a Ln(Price) 1 a Population 1 a Qtr 2 (12) 12 3 4
1 a Qtr 3 1 a Qtr 4, 56
(Supply) Ln(Price) 5 b 1 b EREIT 1 b Foreclose 1 b EGI (13) 12 3 4
1 b Permits. 5
Permits is the number of apartment units authorized in a given quarter. It was derived
from data compiled by the Census Bureau reported in Table 3: Selected Metropolitan
Statistical Areas—New Privately Owned Housing Units Authorized in Permit-Issuing
Places in Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits. Ln(Price) is the natural
logarithm of the apartment property sale price. Population is a quarterly estimate for
the MSA derived from Regional Economic Information System data. Qtr 2, 3 and 4
are indicator variables accounting for seasonal variation in construction starts.
Foreclose is a dummy variable representing a sale by an owner who acquired the
property through foreclosure. Foreclosure status is included in the model to account
for its effect on price (Shilling, Benjamin and Sirmans, 1990; Forgey, Rutherford and
VanBuskirk, 1994; and Hardin and Wolverton, 1996). EREIT is a dummy variable
indicating that the purchaser was a real estate investment trust.
EGI is the effective gross income at the time of a given apartment sale. EGI captures
the exogenous effects (Zs) of property characteristics, location, condition and vacancy.
It represents economic performance at the apartment complex level as determined in
the apartment rental market. Pagliari and Webb (1996) recognize the interaction of
apartment vacancy rates and rental rates and postulate that effective gross income is
a more meaningful measure than other measures used to benchmark property
performance.
Equations (12) and (13) were estimated simultaneously on the Atlanta, Phoenix and
Seattle data to test the statistical null hypothesis Ho: b2 5 0. Results of the empirical
analyses follow.
Empirical Results
As indicated, a log-linear regression model is used to model supply with the dependent
variable being the natural log of apartment sales price. New construction permits is
the dependent variable for the demand model. The estimation results are presented in
Exhibit 5. The Atlanta, Phoenix and Seattle models are highly signiﬁcant and capture
most of the variability in the price equations. The adjusted R2 for the Atlanta price
equation is .828; for the Phoenix price equation, the adjusted R2 is .734; and for
Seattle the price equation adjusted R2 is .819. The adjusted R2for the Atlanta demand
(Permit) equation is .865; the adjusted R2 for Phoenix is .400; and the adjusted R2
for Seattle is .407.
The variable coefﬁcients in all sets of equations are as expected. Permits increase






















































Simultaneous Equation Estimates Equity








Intercept 242,750.00 14.84 25,828.00 14.53 27,667.00 15.06
(215.8)** (157.2)** (22.9)** (115.4)** (24.4)** (178.0)**
EREIT Buyer 0.23 0.24 20.02
(3.3)** (2.3)* (20.3)
Foreclosure 20.10 20.09 20.04
(21.0) (20.4) (20.4)
EGI (000,000) 0.55 0.64 0.55
(18.1)** (15.3)** (20.8)**
Permits (000) 0.07 0.14 0.07
(2.6)* (2.2)* (1.2)
LN (Price) 2276.69 2151.35 220.97
(23.3)** (21.4) (20.3)
Quarter 2 796.00 1,087 136
(5.7)** (25.9)** (1.1)
Quarter 3 1,276 2633 620
(9.2)** (23.0)** (4.6)**
Quarter 4 558 2869 423
(4.3)** (24.1)** (3.6)**
Population (000) 14.70 4.40 4.10
(20.0)** (6.7)** (6.1)**
Adjusted R2 .8654 .8654 .4002 .7337 .4071 .8139
Note: t-Statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
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greater in non-winter seasons in Atlanta and Seattle due to both areas’ wet and
relatively cold winters, and permitting activity is signiﬁcantly less in non-winter
seasons in Phoenix due to moderate winter weather and extremely hot weather during
May through September. Foreclosure does not evidence statistical signiﬁcance in any
of the models. The coefﬁcient on EGI is positive, as expected, and highly signiﬁcant;
showing the expected connection between an apartment’s price and its earning power.
Endogenous supply and demand schedules are appropriately signed in all of the
estimation models. The negative coefﬁcient on Ln(Price) in the demand models is
indicative of the expectation of a downward sloping demand curve. Conversely, the
positive coefﬁcient on Permits in the three supply models is indicative of the
expectation of an upward sloping supply curve. Ln(Price) is statistically signiﬁcant
in the Atlanta demand model, and Permits is statistically signiﬁcant in the Atlanta
and Phoenix supply models.
The null hypothesis of b2 5 0 is rejected at the .01 level (p-value 5 .0016) in the
Atlanta apartment market model and at the .05 level (p-value 5 .0241) in the Phoenix
apartment market model. The null hypothesis is not rejected in the Seattle apartment
market model. Rejection of Ho in two of the three models provides supports for an
alternative hypothesis that EREIT buyers have paid prices greater than prices other
market participants were willing to pay. When the coefﬁcients from the two models
with statistically signiﬁcant, EREIT Buyer coefﬁcients are transformed into
percentages (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980), EREITs active in Atlanta have paid
prices 26.1% above the market, and EREITs active in Phoenix have paid prices 27.5%
above the market.
Conclusion
The ﬁndings from this research indicate that EREITs have, at times and within speciﬁc
markets, paid premiums for apartment acquisitions. During an unprecedented period
of asset growth and increased market capitalization, apartment EREITs, by paying, at
times, more than competing property investors were willing to pay, acquired
substantial portfolios of apartment assets. EREIT buyers paid a premium of 26.1% in
the Atlanta market and 27.5% in the Phoenix market. Even though no premium was
found in the Seattle market, there is preliminary support for an agency cost associated
with apartment EREITs’ acquisition strategies. The lack of a premium in the Seattle
market implies that market conditions and capital ﬂows at the local real estate market
level may mitigate an acquisition premium. For example, EREITs may not have seen
Seattle as a core market during the period under study, reducing any potential bidding
frenzy, or they may already have had sizable investments in the Seattle market and
not have been active purchasers. Additional research is necessary to determine how
individual market conditions might reduce the potential for property acquisition
agency costs.
During the period under study, unsecuritized investor groups were unwilling to pay
the premiums for real estate acquisitions that securitized EREIT managers, and by
implication, EREIT investors were willing to accept as a cost of creating apartment124 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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portfolios. Because regulatory constraints on capital retention at the individual EREIT
level require secondary stock offerings as a source of additional equity capital,
continued growth of EREITs will require the investment community’s continued
acceptance of possible property acquisition premiums, implying that EREIT investors
are willing to accept property speciﬁc returns that may be less than those being
realized by traditional unsecuritized investors making direct investments in real estate.
Finally, the persistence of any EREIT premium must be investigated. As the EREIT
industry matures and data become more readily available to all participants in the
EREIT market, corporate and industry strategies and the allocation of capital will be
affected. Additional investigation by property type and replication of the results
presented in this research over different time periods and market conditions are
justiﬁable research topics. Other types of institutional and non-institutional investors
are worthy of investigation as are the potential beneﬁciaries of the noted acquisition
premiums.
Notes
1 Examples include the two recent special editions of the Journal of Real Estate Research
focusing on REITs and the creation of a special section of The Wall Street Journal on REITs.
There is also a Journal of REITs.
2 The focus of this study is the market for real property and not the market for securitized real
estate assets.
3 Equity REIT efﬁciency is not the focus of this paper. The existence of acquisition related
agency costs for EREITs would indicate an additional required comparison between the REIT
form of investment and other forms of real estate investment. However, without substantiation
of EREIT efﬁciencies versus other ownership forms, a property acquisition agency cost would
negatively impact the REIT ownership structure.
4 See Linneman (1997) for a summarization of positive equity REIT attributes and Vogel (1997)
for a contrasting assessment.
5 The smallest apartment complex used in the study was a 102-unit project in Atlanta with an
institutional buyer and seller. The sample excluded non-institutional sized observations. The
lower bound in each data set was derived using the smallest EREIT acquisition at the city level.
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